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We prove the unconditional security of the six-state protocol with threshold detectors and one-
way classical communication. Unlike the four-state protocol (BB84), it has been proven that the
squash operator for the six-state does not exist, i.e., the statistics of the measurements cannot be
obtained via measurement on qubits. We propose a technique to determine which photon number
states are important, and we consider a fictitious measurement on a qubit, which is defined through
the squash operator of BB84, for the better estimation of Eve’s information. As a result, we prove
that the bit error rate threshold for the six-state protocol (12.611%) remains almost the same as
the one of the qubit-based six-state protocol (12.619%). This clearly demonstrates the robustness
of the six-state protocol against the use of the practical devices.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a,03.67.Dd
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows legitimated
users to securely communicate, and the security of QKD,
especially qubit-based QKD, has been well studied so far
[1]. Since we have to assume any possible attack when we
consider the security, the assumption of qubit-detection
must be confirmed or at least its fraction must be esti-
mated with the use of photon number resolving detectors,
detector decoy idea [2], or estimation method via moni-
toring the double click event [3], all of which require some
modifications to QKD protocols.
Another approach for the security proof of QKD with
threshold detectors is to consider the so-called squash
operator [4] which squashes an optical mode down to a
qubit state. This approach only requires to assign the
double-click event (detectors “0” and “1” simultaneously
click) to a random bit value, which is reasonable [5]. The
existence of the squash operator for BB84-type measure-
ment has been proven [6, 7], i.e., the statistics of the
outcomes of the BB84 measurement can be interpreted
as if it stemmed from the BB84 measurement on qubits
whatever optical signal Bob actually receives.
One might think that the squash operator should exist
for any measurement with two outcomes, including the
measurement of the six-state protocol [8], where we per-
form measurements along a basis, Y basis, in addition to
X and Z bases in BB84. In the case of the qubit-based
six-state protocol, the measurement along the extra basis
lets us learn more about Eve’s information gain, resulting
in a higher bit error rate threshold than that of BB84,
which is a main advantage of the qubit-based six-state
protocol over BB84. Unfortunately, it turns out that the
squash operator for the six-state protocol is proven not
to exist [7], and it is unknown whether the advantage still
holds with the use of threshold detectors.
Intuitively, sending more than one-photon is not useful
for the eavesdropping since it may only increase the bit
error rate, and it is hard to imagine that the advantage
of the qubit-based six-state protocol suddenly vanishes
once we lose information about which signal is a single-
photon. In other words, to consider the security of the
six-state protocol with threshold detectors is to consider
the robustness of a qubit-based QKD protocol even if
there is no squash operator. This is indeed one of the
essential features that any practical qubit-based QKD
must possess, and this issue must be seriously taken into
account for the design of a qubit-based QKD protocol.
In this letter, we prove the robustness of the six-state
protocol by showing the bit error rate threshold remains
almost the same (12.611%) compared to the one of the
qubit-based six-state protocol (12.619%). This result
shows that sending multiple photons hardly helps Eve,
which confirms the intuition mentioned above. The rate
is clearly larger than the rate of BB84 with threshold
detectors (11.002%) [6, 7], and this demonstrates the ad-
vantage of using two additional states in the practical
situation. We remark that our work assumes the use of a
single-photon as the information carrier, but we can triv-
ially accommodate the use of an attenuated laser source
by GLLP idea [4].
This letter is organized as follows. We start with a
brief description of how the protocol works, and then we
move on to relatively long outlining the proof, and we de-
vote the rest of the paper to a more detailed explanation.
Finally, we summarize this letter.
Since polarization state of a single-photon and the 12 -
spin state are mathematically equivalent, we use 12 -spin
notation for the explanation in this letter. In the six-
state protocol, Alice first generates a random bit value
b = −1, 1 and choose one basis α randomly out of three
bases X , Y , and Z. Then, she sends over a quantum
channel a qubit with state being |αb〉 that is the eigen
state of α basis of 12 -spin whose eigen value is b/2. Bob
randomly chooses one basis randomly out of the three
bases, and he measures the spin along the chosen di-
2rection. Alice and Bob compare over a public channel
the bases they used, and keep the bit value if the bases
match, othrewise discard it. Alice and Bob repeat this
step many times, and they apply bit error correction [9]
and privacy amplification [9] to the resulting bit string
(sifted key), and they share the key.
Next, we outline our proof. Our proof employs the se-
curity proof based on complementarity scenario proposed
by Koashi [10]. In this proof, we consider two protocols,
one is the actual protocol which Alice and Bob actually
conduct, and the other one is a virtual protocol. Let us
assume that Alice has a qubit state, which may be fic-
titious, and let Z basis be Alice’s key generating qubit
basis. The goal of the actual protocol is that Bob agrees
on Alice’s bit values along Z basis. On the other hand,
the goal of the virtual protocol is to create an eigen state
of an observable X , which is conjugate to Z, with the
help of Alice and Bob’s arbitrary quantum operations
that commute with Alice’s key generating measurement.
It is proven that if Alice and Bob are free to choose which
protocol to execute after the actual classical and quan-
tum communication and if they can accomplish its goal
whichever choice they have made, then unconditionally
secure key can be distilled.
In order to define Alice’s qubit in the six-state protocol,
suppose that Alice first prepares a qubit pair in the state
1√
2
(|Z−1〉 |Z1〉 − |Z1〉 |Z−1〉) [11] (we choose this singlet
state to fully make use of its symmetry later), measures
one of the qubit by X , Y , or Z-basis, and sends the other
qubit to Bob. Since this process outputs the exactly the
same state as the one of the actual protocol, we are al-
lowed to work on this scenario without losing any gen-
erality. In the case that we consider the security of the
key generated along Z basis, and once Alice and Bob can
generate |X1〉 state in Alice’s side in the virtual protocol
then we are done since the agreement on the bit value
in the actual protocol can be trivially made via classical
error correction over a public channel (the syndrome is
either encrypted [12] or not [13]).
For the generation of |X1〉 state, an important quan-
tity is the so-called phase error rate, which is the ratio
that Bob’s estimation of Alice’s bit string in X-basis re-
sults in erroneous, and if the estimation of the phase
error rate is exponentially reliable then Alice can gen-
erate |X1〉 by random hashing along X-basis [12–14].
More precisely, the key generation rate G, assuming a
perfect bit error correcting code, can be expressed as
G = nsif [1−H(X)−H(Z|X)]. Here, nsif is the empiri-
cal probability of having the sifted key, H(X) is Shannon
entropy of the bit error, and H(Z|X) is Shannon entropy
of the phase error conditional on the bit error pattern.
In other words, nsifH(X) is the number of the hashing
along Z-basis needed for the agreement of the bit values
in the actual protocol and nsifH(Z|X) is the one along
X-basis needed for the generation of the X-basis eigen
state in the virtual protocol [10]. Hence, the key for the
improvement in the key generation rate is how to mini-
mize the conditional entropy H(Z|X).
For the estimation, we assume without loss of gener-
ality that states received by Bob are classical mixtures
of photon number eigen states, and let PN be the prob-
ability of receiving a state having N photons [15]. Since
we have no direct access to PN , we have to assume the
worst case scenario where Eve maximizes the induced
phase error rate by classically mixing up each photon
number state and sending them to Bob. As we will see
later, it can be proven that states with photon number
being greater than 3 induces too much bit errors and
we can neglect those states for the analysis. Hence, we
can concentrate only on N = 1, 2, 3 cases, and especially
we want to derive the corresponding mutual information
between the bit and phase errors.
To compute the mutual information, we introduce
Bob’s qubit by employing the BB84 squash operator, and
we have to estimate what statistics we would have ob-
tained if we had performed the measurement along Y˜
basis onto the resulting qubit (here, “tilde” means that
this is about a qubit space and fictitous). In general,
the actual Bob’s measurement along Y basis does not
coincide with the measurement along Y˜ basis, however
they do only when N = 1, 2 thanks to the existence of
the squash operator for the six-state protocol [7]. This
gives the same mutual information for N = 1, 2 as the
one of the qubit-based six-state protocol. We note that
to employ BB84 squash, we have to randomly pick up
two bases (for the explanation, we assume that we have
chosen X and Z bases) out of the three bases in the ac-
tual protocol. This random choice does not change the
actual protocol at all. The reason is that we can always
split the basis choice into two steps: the first one is the
choice of two bases out of the three and then one basis
is chosen from the two. Moreover, we assume in the ac-
tual protocol that Alice and Bob perform joint random
bit-flip operation to make the analysis simpler.
To analyze N = 3 case, we use the symmetry of the
density operator. As a result, we can estimate the mutual
information. Finally, by mixing up the photon number
state N = 1, 2, 3 based on the worst case scenario, we
show that the bit error rate threshold for the six-state
protocol with threshold detectors is 12.611%. This is the
end of outlining the proof, and we explain why N ≥ 3
can be neglected and the derivation of the bit error rate
threshold in what follows, in which we take the asymp-
totic limit such that the number of the pulses is infinite
and we neglect statistical fluctuations.
Our goal is to minimize H(Z|X), and observe that
this quantity can be rewritten as the convex combi-
nation of the conditional Shannon entropy H(Z|X) =∑∞
N=1 PNH(Z|X)(N), where H(Z|X)(N) is the condi-
tional Shannon entropy that is derived from N -photon
detection event by Bob. Imagine that we make a two-
dimensional (2D) plot of H(Z|X)(N) as a function of
the bit error rate eb. The convex combination suggests
that we have to consider a convex hull, each of whose ex-
treme points corresponds to
(
eb, H(Z|X)(N)
)
in the 2D
plane. Thanks to the existence of the squash operator
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FIG. 1: Plot ofH(Z|X)(1,2) (dashed line), h(eb) (dotted line),
1− h(eb) (dot-dashed line), and a tangent (solid line) whose
tangent point (B=(0.12619.., 0.54690..)) is the intersection
of 1 − h(eb) and H(Z|X)
(1,2). We can neglect any point in
the gray-filled regime for the security.
for the six-state protocol [7], the plot of H(Z|X)(1,2) ≡
H(Z|X)(N) for N = 1, 2 is the same as the one of the
qubit-based six-state protocol [8], which is expressed as
H(Z|X)(1,2) ≡ eb + (1− eb)h
(
eb
2(1− eb)
)
. (1)
Here, h(x) ≡ −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x), and
H(Z|X)(1,2) is depicted in Fig. 1 as the dashed line, in
which h(eb) (dotted line), 1 − h(eb) (dot-dashed line),
and a tangent (solid line) are also plotted. The bit error
rate of the intersection (A) of the dotted line and the
dot-dashed line represents the bit error rate threshold of
BB84, and the one (B) of the dot-dashed line and the
dashed line represents the bit error rate threshold of the
six-state protocol up to N = 2. C is the intersection of
the dotted line and the tangent whose tangent point is B.
Note that H(Z|X)(N) for any N ≥ 3 can never be larger
than h(eb) (dotted line) as we use the squash operator
for BB84. Also note that the dotted and dashed lines are
concave, and an achievable point can be generated by the
convex combination of a point along the dashed line and
a point below the dotted line such that the average bit
error rate coincides with the observed error rate. Sup-
pose that we take convex combination of a point along
the dashed line whose bit error rate is lower than the bit
error rate of B (12.619..%) and a point in the gray-filled
region. Since this convex combination only decreases the
mutual information, it follows that we neglect any pho-
ton number state whose minimum bit error rate is larger
than the bit error rate of C (25.677...%). According to
analysis in [16], it turns out that the minimum bit error
rate is strictly larger than 25.677...% for N ≥ 4 (note
that the minimum bit error rate is not zero for N ≥ 2
since only the singlet state (N = 1) has the symmetry
that has the zero bit error rate). Thus, we are left with
working only on N = 3 case.
For the derivation of H(Z|X)(3), we first consider
symmetrization of the state ρ
(3)
sym that Alice and Bob
share. Recall that our protocol is invariant under the
interchange of the basis and bit-flip in each basis. This
symmetrization process is represented by a group G
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FIG. 2: Fig. 1 without its tangent and with (eb,H(Z|X)
(3))
taking values in the shadow regime. H(Z|X) for eb ≤ 0.115...
is H(Z|X)(1,2) (dashed line) and the solid line represents
H(Z|X) for 0.115... < eb ≤ 1/4. The solid line is a tan-
gent of the dashed line at D = (0.115..., 0.42407...), which
means the slight degradation of the bit error rate threshold.
that is generated by {Rα} where Rα is pi/2 rotation
along α-basis (α = X,Y, Z) of a qubit state. Also
note that any rotation of the state on H⊥, which is an
orthogonal complement to H being spanned by {|αb〉⊗4},
does not change the measurement outcomes since the
state on H⊥ always induces double-click (one can also
check this with POVM to be mentioned). Thus, we
are allowed to work on the symmetrized density matrix
ρ
(3)
sym ≡
∫
dU
∑
g∈G[g · 1H⊥ ⊕UH]ρ3[g · 1H⊥ ⊕UH]]†/|G|.
A bit tedious calculation with Shur’s lemma gives us
ρ
(3)
sym = r0P0 + r1P1 + r2P2 + r31H⊥ [16], where rm ≥ 0
(m = 0, 1, 2, 3), and P0,1,2 is a projector onto the
subspace spanned by {|−1/2,−3/2〉 − |1/2, 3/2〉,√
3 |−1/2,−1/2〉 + |1/2,−3/2〉, √3 |1/2, 1/2〉 +
|−1/2, 3/2〉}, {|−1/2, 1/2〉− |1/2,−1/2〉, |−1/2,−1/2〉−√
3 |1/2,−3/2〉, |1/2, 1/2〉 − √3 |−1/2, 3/2〉} and
{|−1/2, 1/2〉 + |1/2,−1/2〉, |−1/2,−3/2〉 + |1/2, 3/2〉}.
Here, the first (second) index in each ket represents Z
component of Alice’s (Bob’s) 12 -spin (3
1
2 -spins with
total angular momentum being 3/2) with eigen values
being 1/2 and −1/2 (3/2, 1/2, −1/2, and −3/2).
To calculate the mutual information, we consider
what error rate (ey˜) we would have obtained if we
had performed the measurement along Y˜ basis onto
Alice and Bob’s qubit, in which Bob’s qubit is de-
fined through the BB84 squash operator. Bob’s POVM
{M⊗4αb } corresponding to detection of the bit value
b = −1, 1 along α basis is represented by Mαb ≡
1
2
(
P (|αb〉)⊗N − P (|α−b〉)⊗N + 1
)
, where P (|αb〉) ≡
|αb〉 〈αb| and 1 /2 represents the random assignment of
the double-click event, and POVM for detecting α-basis
error Γα is [11] Γα ≡ P (|α1〉)⊗Mα1 +P (|α−1〉)⊗Mα−1 .
POVM for detecting Y˜ basis error on qubit pair is
given by Γ˜y ≡ P (|Y1〉) ⊗ FBB84 (P (|Y1〉)) + P (|Y−1〉) ⊗
FBB84 (P (|Y−1〉)), where FBB84(·) is a map from the
qubit space to 3-photon space, which is represented by
Kraus operator for the BB84 squash [6, 7]. Using all of
them, the bit error rate eb and ey˜ are respectively repre-
sented by eb ≡ TrΓαρ(3)sym = 14r0− 34r1+ 12r2+ 12 and ey˜ ≡
4TrΓ˜yρ
(3)
sym =
1
2r0− 12r1+ 12 , and what we have to do is to
derive ey˜ as a function of eb and to maximize H(Z|X)(3).
In the equation of eb and ey˜, we erase the parameter r3
by using the condition Trρ
(3)
sym = 1, which follows that
the positivity condition of ρ
(3)
sym reads r0, r1, r2 ≥ 0 and
3r0 + 3r1 + 2r2 ≤ 1. By introducing a parameter set
{t, s, u} with 0 ≤ t, u ≤ 1 and −1 ≤ s ≤ 1, we can express
r0 = ut(1 + s)/6, r1 = ut(1 − s)/6, and r2 = u(1− t)/2,
and we use this parameterization to derive the regime
{eb, ey˜} that ρ(3)sym can take. The regime is represented by
the triangle with vertices being {1/4, 1/3}, {7/12, 2/3},
and {3/4, 1/2} in {eb, ey˜}-plane, which means that ey˜ is
always bounded by linear functions of eb. This triangle
can be translated into the shadow regime in Fig. 2 via
H(Z|X)(3) = ebh[(2eb−ey˜)/(2eb)]+(1−eb)h[ey˜/(2−2eb)]
that coincides with H(Z|X)(1,2) when eb = ey˜, and we
note that the tangent in Fig. 1 crosses the shadow regime
in Fig. 2 so that the bit error rate threshold should de-
grade. By considering the convex hull of H(Z|X)(N) for
N = 1, 2, 3, the upper bound of H(Z|X), which we ex-
press as H(Z|X), is given by
H(Z|X)
=
{
H(Z|X)(1,2) in case 0.115... > eb
(2.82...) eb + 0.0976... in case
1
4 ≥ eb ≥ 0.115...
This is also shown in Fig. 2. From this expression, we
can derive the bit error rate threshold of 12.6112...% by
solving H(Z|X) = 1− h (eb) with respect to eb.
Remarks: For the first sight, our analysis assumes that
Alice and Bob’s pair states are identically and indepen-
dently distributed. A way to treat unconditional security
is to use the argument based on quantum de Finetti the-
orem [17] or Azuma’s inequality [18, 19]. In the latter ar-
gument, we consider an arbitrary whole Alice and Bob’s
state, not just a pair state, and we consider to perform
the Bell basis measurement from the first qubit pair in or-
der. ρsym is now interpreted as the state of a particular
qubit pair conditional on arbitrary Bell basis measure-
ment outcomes. It follows that ey˜ and eb are probability
also being conditional on the outcomes, which is a prop-
erty required in applying Azuma’s inequality, and most
importantly the relation between them are linear as we
have already mentioned (for 4 ≤ N case, it is given by
0 ≤ ey˜ ≤ 1 and 0.25677... ≤ eb). Thus, we can convert
our analysis into the analysis of the unconditional secu-
rity proof by using exactly the same argument as [19].
To summarize, we prove the unconditional security of
the six-state protocol with threshold detectors. For the
proof, we propose a technique to determine which photon
number states are important, and we employ the squash
operator for BB84 and the estimation of the mutual in-
formation that can be obtained via Y basis fictitious mea-
surement on the resulting qubit state. In this letter we
consider one-way quantum communication protocol, and
our analysis may apply to two-way quantum communi-
cation protocol such as BBM92 type QKD [20], which we
leave for the future study. Security proof of other pro-
tocols with threshold detectors are also another future
works.
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